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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal Transfers, Horizontal Equity and Post-Secondary Education 
Horizontal equity is interpreted to mean that equals in different provinces should 
be treated equally. We argue that current arrangements for government funding of 
post-secondary education in Canada are flawed because they contain provisions 
which perpetuate disparities in the treatment of Canadians by province of 
residence. Current arrangements are criticized for inadequate equalization and 
lack of expenditure standards. An education-needs adjustment factor is suggested. 
Fiscal equity strives to ensure that citizens in all provinces have access to 
comparable services and bear comparable tax burdens. The cost of services is 
conditional on the expenditure standard selected and the number of beneficiaries. 
The capacity to provide the service is related to the population and wealth of the 
province. Accordingly, our suggested amendment incorporates all these elements; 
it allows greater fiscal transfers to provinces experiencing greater need and/or 
smaller tax bases. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Transferts fiscaux, égalité horizontale et éducation postsecondaire 
Par «égalité horizontale», nous entendons le principe selon lequel tous les 
citoyens des différentes provinces ont droit aux mêmes égards face au gouverne-
ment. Nous pensons que les moyens de financement actuels de l'éducation 
postsecondaire au Canada sont défectueux, puisqu'ils comprennent des clauses 
qui perpétuent les inégalités existantes entre les Canadiens d'après leur province 
d'origine. Nous en critiquons par ailleurs certaines disproportions relatives à la 
distribution des fonds ainsi que l'absence de critères régissant /' allocation de ces 
fonds. Il faut donc envisager un ajustement des dépenses qui respecte les besoins 
de chaque province en matière d'éducation. 
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Le principe même de l'égalité fiscale suppose que les citoyens de toutes les 
provinces reçoivent les mêmes services et paient les mêmes impôts. Le coût des 
services dépend des critères choisis pour l'allocation des fonds et du nombre de 
bénéficiaires. La capacité d'assurer des services dépend de la population et de la 
richesse de chaque province. Ces divers éléments se retrouvent donc dans 
l'amendement que nous suggérons, à savoir que les transferts de capitaux soient 
plus importants vers les provinces qui ont les besoins les plus pressants ou vers 
celles dont les revenus sont les plus faibles. 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle of horizontal equity requires the equal treatment of equals. Equal 
treatment is particularly difficult whenever population is geographically dispersed 
such that the impact of social policies vary with place of residence; and even more 
so under a federal constitutional structure, when responsibility for the well being 
of citizens is divided between two orders of government. Consequently, the 
meaning of horizontal equity is less clear. Must equals in different provinces be 
treated equally when social programming is a provincial responsibility? If so, this 
would require some notion of national standards and imply that provincial wishes 
are subordinate somehow to national objectives. Or is it sufficient that equals 
within any province be treated equally? If social programming is exclusively 
within provincial jurisdiction, the implication is quite clear. Horizontal equity is 
only relevant when pursued by a government enjoying the requisite constitutional 
authority. Thus equals in different provinces need not be treated equally when 
social policy is purely a provincial responsibility.' 
Horizontal equity also has implications for intergovernmental financial trans-
fers and the interpretation of fiscal equity. Fiscal equity is taken to mean that 
citizens in all provinces should have access to comparable services and bear 
comparable tax burdens. But should service levels be compared with the most 
generously provided program? And are tax burdens to be gauged against the most 
wealthy province? How, if at all, do provincial needs affect fiscal equity and 
equalization? 
In this paper we interpret horizontal equity to mean that equals in different 
provinces should be treated equally. This stance guides our analysis of 
federal-provincial fiscal arrangements for financing social policy, especially 
post-secondary education. We argue that current arrangements for governmental 
funding of post-secondary education (PSE) are fundamentally flawed because they 
contain provisions which result in disparities in the treatment of Canadians by 
province of residence. Canada recently reaffirmed that federal support of 
post-secondary education must serve two goals: (1) "the maintenance and 
development of a strong and effective post-secondary system across Canada" and 
(2) "access to such a system on the part of all qualified and interested Canadians" 
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(Canada 1985, 58). It further stated that federal transfers are the major vehicle for 
achieving the former objective. Direct student aid programs are designed to 
achieve accessibility. Because the horizontal equity implications of direct student 
support programs are quite transparent, this paper confines itself to the less 
obvious horizontal equity aspects connected with fiscal transfers and the first of the 
two above federal goals in post-secondary education. 
The next section discusses current financial arrangements for social policy in 
Canada and identifies major problems. We argue that the EPF (the program which 
finances hospital and medical insurance and post-secondary education) as well as 
the CAP (the program which finances general assistance and welfare services) 
share a common weakness; namely, the perpetuation of a fragmented welfare state 
in which not all Canadians are offered comparable treatment. The following 
section examines post-secondary education in more detail, and shows that current 
financial arrangements contribute to provincial disparities in access to post-
secondary education. The final section comments on the recent reform proposals 
of the Johnson Report (1985) and the Macdonald Commission (1985) as well as 
presenting our own suggestion to achieve horizontal equity. 
The current system of fiscal arrangements 
The British North America Act, 1867, created a federation whereby the central 
government enjoys jurisdiction over national issues, and provincial governments 
have responsibility for local matters. The areas within provincial competence 
include: education, hospitals, administration of justice, licensing of business, 
property and civil rights, and matters of local or private concern. Since significant 
state involvement in social policy was not contemplated at the time of 
Confederation, the BNA Act contained few references to social welfare matters. 
Furthermore, subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act has confirmed 
provincial responsibility for most areas of social policy. Accordingly, the specific 
assignment of the BNA Act together with a tradition of private and municipal 
social delivery combined to produce a welfare state with few national programs 
and little consistency across the country (Hum 1983). 
Beginning in the 1920s, the national government came under increasing 
pressure to assume a role in social policy. This pressure can be traced to two 
sources. First, the constitutional assignment of tax and spending powers resulted 
in fiscal imbalance. Provinces found themselves responsible for many expensive 
policy areas but lacking in ability to raise funds. They responded by petitioning 
Ottawa for increased financial resources. Second, Canadians were demanding 
more social programs and politicians in Ottawa had to heed electorial wishes in 
order to acquire or retain power. 
The national government responded in three ways. The first response was to 
support provincial social policy through a conditional or cost sharing grant. The 
Old Age Pension Act of 1927, which committed the national government to 
reimburse provinces for payments to persons over 70 years of age, was the first 
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such shared cost program in the social policy sphere. Since then shared-cost 
programs have proliferated to include: support for general social assistance and 
social services, medicare, hospital insurance, and post-secondary education. The 
second type of response was to negotiate amendments to the BNA Act. 
Constitutional amendments, such as those granting the national government 
competence to make laws governing Unemployment Insurance and the Canada 
Pension Plan, permanently altered the distribution of legislative powers, thereby 
enabling the national government to deliver certain programs. The final type of 
response was for the national government to provide direct payments to 
individuals, and to finance them out of general revenues. Family Allowances, Old 
Age Security, and the Guaranteed Income Supplement are examples of programs 
in which the central government makes direct payments to citizens. 
With respect to education in particular, the period 1867 to 1912 saw little federal 
government involvement. Education was a local (Parish or municipal) responsi-
bility and a relatively low cost area. Thus the earliest transfers, the statutory 
subsidies, were not motivated by concerns related to education. The only two 
important federal initiatives in education appear to be the establishment of the 
Royal Military College in 1876 and a gift, in the form of a 150,000 acre 
endowment, to the University of Manitoba. 
Public pressure for federal involvement in education began to build just after the 
turn of the century. In 1910 the federal government appointed the Royal 
Commission on Industrial Training and Vocational Education. This Royal 
Commission left a mark on most federal initiatives in the period that followed. 
The first conditional grant program in Canada was introduced in 1913 under the 
auspices of the Agricultural Instruction Act. The program was a response to 
demands for vocational training emanating from the agricultural community. 
Eggleton and Kraft (1939: 40) argued that the federal response was necessary 
because provincial governments did not have sufficient revenue to act alone. The 
grants were not matching. Thus, despite the absence of adjustments based on need 
or tax capacity, the program did not severely penalize poor provinces. 
In 1919 the federal government introduced the Technical Education Act which 
committed the federal government to spend ten million dollars over a ten-year 
period on upgrading vocational training and industrial education. The grants were 
of the matching type - a fact which made it difficult for the poorer provinces to 
access available monies. When the Act lapsed in 1929, Ontario was the only 
province to have taken full advantage of the allotted funds. James Maxwell (1937) 
has argued that these grants not only favoured rich provinces but also induced poor 
provinces to engage in schemes beyond their fiscal strength. 
As the end of the Technical Education Act neared, another Royal Commission 
to study vocational education was struck. This resulted in the Vocational 
Education Act of 1931. However, with the depression and the associated decline in 
revenue and rise in expenditures, the federal government was forced to rethink its 
involvement in education. The Vocational Education Act was never proclaimed -
despite the fact that it passed both Houses of Parliament. The Technical Education 
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Act was given two extensions which prolonged its existence until 1939 
(Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements 1981, 56). 
The depression directed federal attention to another aspect of the education 
system: the absence of occupational skills among those leaving school. In an 
attempt to alleviate this problem the federal government introduced the Unemploy-
ment and Agricultural Assistance Act which contained provisions for conditional 
subsidies to support various occupational training projects. This Act was 
proclaimed in 1937 and was replaced in 1939 by the Youth Training Act. 
Federal involvement in education in the years 1912 to 1939 reflected the work of 
the 1910 Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Vocational Education. The 
objectives were purely economic: the national economy required a continuing 
supply of skilled manpower to assure economic growth. 
No program reflected concerns for equality of opportunity or horizontal equity. 
Indeed, the 50-50 cost sharing approach adopted in many programs of this period 
probably exacerbated educational disparities since only the rich provinces were in 
a position to take full advantage of the available monies and resources of the poor 
provinces were probably diverted from primary and secondary education into 
vocational training. Thus horizontal equity concerns were not the motivating 
factor in any of the early programs. 
It is generally held that governments enjoy the right to make gifts; a right derived 
from the doctrine of Royal Prerogative and common law. Furthermore, conditions 
may be attached to these gifts or grants; individuals or government may refuse 
these gifts if they disagree with the conditions attached; but in any case such gifts 
do not violate any rules of constitutional jurisdiction. Quebec has always 
questioned the constitutionality of cost-shared schemes and direct transfers to 
individuals. 
Elsewhere (Strain & Hum 1987) we have argued that the history of the Canadian 
welfare state has been a gradual movement towards national social citizenship 
rights, and thus broad-based horizontal equity. However, we also noted that this 
evolution is incomplete, despite general equalization, which purports to adjust the 
overall fiscal capacity of the poorer provinces. National programs, whether direct 
transfer programs financed out of general revenue, (e.g., Old Age Security) or 
contributory social insurance programs made possible through constitutional 
amendment (e.g., Unemployment Insurance) are generally consistent with 
horizontal equity. But provincial programs such as social assistance or post-
secondary education, which are partly financed through fiscal transfers, are not 
horizontally equitable. This is largely due to two fundamental flaws in the current 
system of intergovernmental transfers. 
Both of these flaws can be found in the original design of the 1927 Old Age 
Pension Program. This program required the national government to reimburse the 
provinces $.50 for every $1.00 spent on old age pensions: the so-called 50/50 
cost-sharing formula. But this arrangement penalizes provinces with limited fiscal 
resources. If a province does not have the financial wherewithal to introduce a 
program, it cannot be reimbursed for its nonexistent expenditure. Further, heavier 
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burdens are imposed upon lower-income provinces which have programs because 
they have to levy heavier taxes to provide their share of the costs unless there is full 
general equalization. Uneven development of social programs will result. Indeed, 
it was 1936 before all provinces were even participating in the cost-shared Old Age 
Pension program. 
The second design flaw is the absence of explicit national standards of any sort. 
This flaw was remedied in 1948 when the Old Age Pension Act was amended to 
ensure some measure of uniformity. However, in later programs, particularly CAP 
(Canada Assistance Plan) and EPF (Established Program Financing) this problem 
would re-emerge, and remains still. 
Existence of these two flaws has been recognized for some time. The difficulties 
associated with achieving horizontal equity in the face of disparities in fiscal 
capacity were explicitly treated in the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission Report in 
the late 1930s. The Rowell-Sirois Report recommended a system of National 
Adjustment Grants to remedy the problem. The National Adjustment Grant would 
enable all provinces to supply the average level of public services without having 
to impose rates of taxation greater than required, on average, in Canada as a whole. 
The grant would account for disparities in both tax capacity as well as fiscal need 
(e.g., provincial differences in the amount of poverty, provincial differences in the 
numbers of students in the educational system, etc.). The Rowell-Sirois Report 
also addressed the question of national standards but opposed them, arguing that 
imposition of national standards represented an unwarranted intrusion into 
provincial jurisdiction. 
Although these recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Report were never acted 
upon directly, the national government did accept some of the basic principles 
enunciated, and it eventually began to address the problem of unequal fiscal 
capacity. The Tax Rental Agreements of the 1940s and early 1950s were designed 
to incorporate an element of equalization. Then, in 1957, the national government 
introduced a formal equalization program to address disparities in tax capacities. 
We have considered the Canadian system of equalization payments in detail 
elsewhere (Hum & Strain 1984). Here, we merely note three features of the 
program which perpetuate horizontal inequities in Canadian social programs. 
First, the formula only adjusts for differences in tax capacities. No account is taken 
of disparities in fiscal need, thus there is no provision to increase the flow of funds 
to provinces where expenditure demands are relatively high. Second, the program 
does not "equalize" tax capacity. Rather, it brings the poorer provinces up to a 
specific standard (after 1982 this was a standard set by five Canadian provinces). 
Consequently, richer provinces still enjoy the capacity to provide their citizens 
with better services or lower taxes. Finally, the program is under the exclusive 
control of the national government, which finances it out of its own revenues. This 
is especially significant in an era of restraint when, for example, Ottawa decides to 
limit the growth in payments. In effect, the equalization formula is overridden 
whenever the formula requires payments above the specified maximum. 
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The general equalization program, then, is not sufficient to assure horizontal 
equity in social policy. It cannot incorporate national standards (because it is an 
unconditional transfer); the formula fails to account for differences in fiscal needs; 
it does not truly "equalize" tax capacity, and it is vulnerable to ad hoc changes. 
The inadequacies of the equalization formula as an instrument for horizontal 
equity could be addressed, in principle, through changes in other transfer 
programs designed to finance specific social programs. This is the conclusion of 
another study which addressed the horizontal equity issue in examining the Canada 
Assistance Plan (Hum 1983). The following sections of this paper illustrate how 
the Established Program Financing provisions for post-secondary education might 
be altered to achieve horizontal equity, but before turning to the EPF, we 
summarize the approach taken by Hum. 
The Canada Assistance Plan is a 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement covering a 
variety of provincial general assistance and personal social service programs. 
There is substantial variation in the treatment of Canadians across provinces. For 
example, in 1980 general social assistance payments for a family of four ranged 
from a low of $6,400 in Nova Scotia to a high of $ 10,500 in Alberta. Hum argues 
that two changes would have to be made to CAP to redress horizontal inequities. 
First, the Plan would have to specify a minimum national standard, a standardized 
basic allowance. Second, the Plan must incorporate an adjustment to account for 
variation in tax capacity and fiscal need. This adjustment would then assure that a 
poorer province could afford to participate in the program without penalizing its 
citizens through higher taxes, or poorer services in other areas, or both. 
The details of the suggested amendment are relatively straightforward. Since 
the tax burden imposed by a program which incorporates a standardized basic 
allowance is sensitive to two factors - the total cost of the program and the 
provincial tax base available to finance it - an adjustment incorporating both these 
factors is necessary. Conveniently, a simple "needs index" responsive to the 
number of poor requiring assistance, the extent of their poverty, and incomes 
(including natural resource revenues) generated in the province provides all the 
requisite information. If this index were introduced into the CAP cost-sharing 
formula, provinces with extensive poverty and/or a small tax base would receive 
more support than provinces not suffering these liabilities. 
A similar index is used in our analysis of the EPF provisions for post-secondary 
education in the last section. 
Financing post-secondary education in Canada 
Although post-secondary education falls within the constitutional jurisdiction of 
the provinces, this has not kept the national government from financial 
participation in this field. Indeed, about 80 percent of provincial operating grants 
to universities and colleges are now financed by the national government. What is 
the rationale for financial involvement by the national government? Is it merely a 
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convenient ploy to by-pass the restrictions of a constitution which placed educa-
tion in the hands of the provinces? If so, is horizontal equity an issue? 
Prior to 1945, the federal government was a minor player. Universities and 
colleges operated under provincial charter, relying heavily on tuition fees, private 
donations, and bequests for funds. Federal participation was limited to two very 
small cost-shared programs covering agricultural education and occupational 
training. 
The Veterans Rehabilitation Act, 1945, increased national involvement in 
post-secondary education dramatically. This legislation gave bursaries to over 
50,000 veterans, enabling them to attend university at little or no cost to 
themselves. It also provided direct grants to universities in recognition of the fact 
that student fees accounted for only about 40 percent of revenue. These funds were 
a welcomed source of money for Canadian universities but eventually evaporated 
with the inevitable decline in the number of veterans enrolled. 
The noteworthy feature of this early incursion into post-secondary education is 
its underlying rationale. The bursaries and grants distributed under the Veterans 
Rehabilitation Act were not motivated by a concern for universities per se. Rather, 
the intent was simply to support the education of a specific group of Canadian 
citizens. 
The emphasis on students and student aid changed with the Report of the Royal 
Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Science (the 
Massey Commission) in 1951. The Massey Commission, in keeping with its 
overall concern with cultural awareness and national identity, adopted a social 
utility view of post-secondary education. It acknowledged the economic contribu-
tion of universities and students, but it did not emphasize them. Instead, the 
universities' role in the development of national culture, science, and our 
understanding of ourselves as a people was highlighted. Consequently, the 
Commission recommended grants to support the work, broadly defined, of 
Canadian universities. The focus had shifted from educating students to fostering 
national institutions. 
Shortly after the Commission's report was tabled in the House of Commons, the 
Prime Minister announced that "The government has ... reached the conclusion 
that it is in the national interest to take immediate action to assist universities to 
perform functions which are quite essential to the Country." 
The national government introduced a program of direct grants to universities to 
achieve its objectives. The provinces, particularly Quebec, objected to this 
arrangement since it involved direct transfers rather than indirect and uncondi-
tional transfers through the provinces. However, the arrangement was continued, 
with an adjustment which affected only Quebec, until 1967. 
The actual distribution of funds to universities and colleges was based on a 
two-tier formula. The formula first established provincial pools using a per capita 
transfer ($.50 in 1951, increasing to $5.00 in 1966). Then the provincial pools 
were allocated to institutions within each province on the basis of enrollment. 
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The new arrangements undoubtedly reflected new national government 
objectives. The Veterans Rehabilitation Act had established portable student 
bursaries and grants to support a specific group of Canadian students. This system 
could have been expanded to include a wider target population. However, a system 
of portable bursaries and grants would not have guaranteed the development of 
strong institutions in each province. A transfer which incorporated the provinces 
explicitly (as was done with the introduction of provincial pools) was thought 
necessary.2 Also, the fact that education remains a provincial responsibility 
doubtlessly influenced the design of the new program. 
Unlike the Veterans Rehabilitation Act and similar student based aid programs, 
the new arrangement focused on post-secondary institutions and assured the 
continued development of these institutions in each province. This approach 
helped institutions in the poorer provinces which, due to chronic underfunding, 
would have had difficulty attracting students and student-based federal funding. 
The underlying objective of the 1951 program to encourage the development of 
a strong and effective post-secondary education system across the country remains 
an explicit goal of national government. Moreover, the approach adopted in 1951 
is similar to that used today, with the important difference that the per capita 
transfer now goes to the provincial governments, who are free to spend it in any 
way they choose. 
The current system of unconditional per capita transfers evolved from changes 
first announced at a federal provincial conference in October 1966. After 1966, the 
national government began to transfer funds to the provinces rather than directly to 
universities. This arrangement involved an abatement of four equalized percent-
age points of personal income tax and one equalized point of corporate income tax, 
plus an adjustment payment to bring the total transfer up to 50 percent of allowable 
operating costs of post-secondary education, or $15.00 per capita, whichever was 
greater. 
The changes announced in 1966 increased the flow of funds to post-secondary 
institutions, although now through the provincial governments. However, because 
the new transfer was based on a matching formula, it incorporated all the basic 
design flaws typified by the 1927 Old Age Pension Plan - the traditional "50/50 
matching formula". And in the absence of "full equalization", provinces which 
have a relatively high demand for post-secondary education, or a relatively small 
tax base, will be forced to impose higher tax rates or provide poorer services in 
other areas,3 if they are to maintain national standards in post-secondary 
education. But the transfer does not provide incentives to maintain national 
standards. Consequently, the quality of post-secondary education varies widely 
across provinces. 
In the 1970s this transfer program came under attack, but not because of the 
basic design flaws discussed above. Instead, criticism arose for other reasons. The 
federal government, faced with growing deficits, wanted more control over its 
own spending. The provinces, too, were unhappy. They argued thé scheme 
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TABLE 1: Post-Secondary Education Transfers 
as a Percentage of Provincial Operating Grants 
to Universities and Colleges 
Transfer as a * of Reduction in Purely 
Operating Grants Provincial Share 
1977-78 1984 -85 
Newfoundland 83 . 3* 106 .9* 23 . , 936 
P. E. I. 101 .5* 106 . 9% 5 . 3% 
Nova Scotia 87. . 5* 91 . 6% 4 . 1% 
New Brunswick 98. . 1* 101 . 8« 3 . 1% 
Quebec 56. . IX 59 . 6% 3 . 5% 
Ontario / 73 . 7* 88 . 7% 15. . 0% 
Manitoba 80. 3* 102 . 9% 22 . 5% 
Saskatchewan 81 . 6* 90. . 3* 8 .7* 
Alberta 63 . 9* 73 . , 1* 9 . 2% 
British Columbia 78 . 9% 104 . 3* 25 .4$ 
Canada 68. 9X 79 . 6% 10 . 7* 
Source: A. W. Johnson; Giving Greater Point and Purpose to 
the Federal Financing of Postsecondary Education and 
Research in Canada (Ottawa: Secretary of State. 
1985 ) 
distorted provincial planning in an area within provincial jurisdiction. These 
factors influenced the development of the 1977 transfer scheme. 
This new transfer scheme was incorporated in the Established Program 
Financing (EPF) sections of the 1977 Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act. 
The EPF represented a major shift in the financing of three important cost-shared 
programs: hospital insurance, medicare, and post-secondary education. Although 
the new transfer scheme was based on an extremely complex formula, it was, in 
essence, a straightforward unconditional per capita grant (the hospital insurance 
and medicare provisions did have some strings attached). The transfer was made 
partly in cash, and partly through a transfer of tax points. It was designed to grow 
over time at about the rate of growth of Gross National Product. Since the grant 
was allocated on a per capita basis it was like the 1951 transfer to universities. That 
is, it was not related to the demand for post-secondary education, nor fiscal need. 
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Moreover, because the grant was unconditional it was also not linked to provincial 
spending on post-secondary education; that is, provinces could spend the money in 
any way they chose. This last feature has been subject to extensive criticism (see 
below). 
In 1982, new legislation simplified the EPF arrangement. The transfer became a 
straightforward per capita grant escalated at the rate of GNP growth. In 1984 the 
EPF legislation was amended and re-titled the Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrange-
ments and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act, 1977. 
The GNP escalator was changed for 1983-84 and 1984-85 to keep expenditures 
consistent with the national government's "6 and 5" program. Michael Wilson's 
1985 budget continued this restraint policy by limiting increases in transfers to the 
rate of growth of general government expenditures. 
As noted above, the unconditional nature of the fiscal transfer has attracted 
criticism. In 1977, federal cash and tax point transfers comprised about 70 percent 
of provincial government operating grants to universities. By 1985, this 
proportion had increased to 80 percent. As the recent Macdonald Commission 
noted: 
This situation has led to accusations that the provincial governments have been 
diverting to other uses large sums that Parliament intended to be spent on PSE. As a 
result many people, both inside and outside post-secondary institutions, have 
expressed concern that the EPF mechanism may not offer the most appropriate 
means of providing future federal support for post-secondary education. 
The consequences of the unconditional nature of the transfer are illustrated in 
Table 1 which clearly indicates that the provinces have reduced their commitment 
to post-secondary education.4 This is a serious problem with the current 
arrangements. However, it is not the only problem. We now argue that the current 
EPF transfer is unlikely to achieve horizontal equity, the second of Canada's 
declared objectives in supporting post-secondary education. 
A national program of direct portable grants to students is consistent with the 
horizontally equitable treatment of students. An institutional based funding 
program like the EPF, on the other hand, rarely achieves horizontal equity. 
Instead, horizontal equity must be achieved through careful design. 
There are a number of proposals which advocate student-based funding as an 
alternative to current EPF arrangements. The underlying assumption is that 
support for post-secondary institutions is provided, primarily, to underwrite 
teaching costs and thus education of students. However, this ignores the first 
declared objective of national government policy: the development of a strong 
post-secondary education system across the country. Under direct student aid, 
students determine the distribution of funds by their choice of institution and these 
choices cannot guarantee the development of strong institutions in each province 
(see Note 2). 
Why is the development of post-secondary institutions in each province even an 
objective of government policy? Is not the best education, regardless of where it is 
acquired, sufficient? The answer, in part, is that post-secondary institutions 
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Canada 3046 1562 210 
Note: Quebec received a tax abatement equal to one corporate 
income tax point in lieu of the transfer 
Sources: S. Petchinis; Financing Postsecondary Education in 
Canada (Toronto: Council of Ministers of Education, 1971) 
and Statistics Canada Education in Canada, Cat. No. 
provide additional benefits to the public, and these benefits, emphasized by the 
Massey Commission, vary with space. Thus, to ensure that all Canadians may 
enjoy these benefits, the maintenance of strong institutions in each province is 
necessary. In the jargon of economics, universities are partly public goods, whose 
benefits decline with distance from the location of the institution. 
It is important to recognize that there are two, analytically distinct, types of 
decisions which are made with respect to post-secondary education. Decisions are 
made by individuals when procuring or buying their education, and decisions are 
made by institutions (or society) for providing or selling that education. Individual 
decisions are based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of alternatives, so 
individuals do what they consider best for them. Institutional decisions, on the 
other hand, are more complex, especially when made on behalf of society. For one 
thing, the time horizons relevant to the two types of decisions are different. 
Moreover, institutional decisions often involve social choice considerations. The 
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TABLE 3: Provincial Operating Grants to Universities 
Per Full Time Equivalent Student 
1983-84 
Province 
Grants Per Full 
Time Equivalent 
AS A * Of 
National Average 
Nf Id. 8909 136.1 
P. E. I. 5796 88.5 
N. S . 5637 86. 1 
N. B. 5629 86.0 
Que . 7345 112.1 
Ont . 5581 85 . 2 
Man. 6075 92 . 8 
Sask. 6519 99 . 6 
Alb. 8266 126. 1 
B . C . 7765 118.6 
Canada 6548 
Source: Secretary of State, Support For Postsecondary Education 
in Canada, 1977-1985 
goal of a strong and effective post-secondary system across the country 
undoubtedly reflects the wishes of Canadians as a society. 
However, the two types of decisions must be complementary. If mobile 
students, as a result of their choices, do not distribute themselves in a way which 
complements the distribution of institutional transfers, problems will emerge. For 
example, if, as is the case with the EPF, funds are distributed on a per capita basis, 
universities and colleges in provinces which educate more than their share of 
students (the appropriate share is taken as the provincial population divided by the 
national population) will receive less funding per student than institutions in 
provinces which attract less than their share of students. This is not horizontally 
equitable. 
Thus, a post-secondary transfer to be horizontally equitable must recognize 
complementarity. But this is not all. As emphasized in our discussions of the 1927 
Old Age Pension Plan and the Canada Assistance Plan, it is also necessary to 
account for differences in tax capacity and fiscal need. Otherwise, provinces will 
have to impose very different tax burdens to provide the same standard of 
education, or standards will vary due to differences in ability to pay. 
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TABLE 4: University Full-Time Equivalent Enrolments 
Per 1,000 of Provincial Population, 1983-84 
Province 
F. T. E. Enrolment 
Per 1,000 
AS A Si Of 
Canadian Average 
Nf Id. 16.0 75 . 1 
P . E .. I. 15.2 71 . 4 
N. S. 29 . 2 137 . 1 
N. B . 21.9 102 . 8 
Que . 20. 4 95 . 8 
Ont. 23 . 9 112.2 
Man. 24 . 2 113.6 
Sask. 21.9 102 . 8 
Alb. 18 . 9 88 . 7 
B . C . 14 . 8 69 . 5 
Canada 21 . 3 
Source: Nova Scotia; Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission 
on Postsecondary Education (Halifax: December 1985) 
The consequences of ignoring these three factors - complementarity, fiscal 
need, and tax capacity - are evident in Table 2, using data generated by the transfer 
program first put in place in 1951. Because the 1951 program involves direct 
grants to universities, provincial diversion of funds (portrayed in Table 1) does not 
arise. Consequently, the data allow us to focus on complementarity and 
differences in fiscal need and tax capacity. 
Table 2 clearly illustrates disparities in the post-secondary education system in 
1966, 15 years after the 1951 program was introduced. Poorer provinces were 
unable to provide grants to their universities and colleges as large as those provided 
by the richer provinces, and disparities in expenditure per student was the result. 
Furthermore, variation in federal transfers illustrates the consequences of ignoring 
complementarity. Universities and colleges in some provinces (for example, Nova 
Scotia) are twice penalized. Not only is their provincial government unable to 
provide funding at national levels, but they are also educating more than the 
province's share of students. (Table 4 gives the distribution of students.) 
The disparities under the current EPF arrangement are illustrated in Table 3. 
Although the details of the disparities have clearly changed, the absence of 
national standards is still quite evident. 
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TABLE 5: Indices of Fiscal Capacity and Provincial 
Tax Rates, 1983 
Own Source Own Source Personal Retail 
Revenues Revenues Plus Income Sales 
(% National Equalization Tax Rate Tax Rate 
Average) (Si of National 
Province Average) 
Nfld. 59.3 85.9 60 12 
P. E. I. 60.1 85.9 52.5 10 
N. S. 71.3 85.9 56.5 10 
N. B. 66.9 85.9 - 58.0 10 
Que. 77.4 85.9 - 9 
Ont . 97.0 91.1 49.2 7 
Man. 80.7 65.9 54.0 6 
Sask. Ì08.1 101.5 51.0 5 
Alb. 206.0 193.6 38.5 0 
B . C . 104.8 98.5 44.0 7 
Notes: (1) Personal Income Tax Rate is calculated as a percent 
of federal tax payable. 
(2) Quebec operates its own personal income tax system. 
Sources: Nova Scotia; Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission 
55 P9§isecondary Education (Halifax: December 1985); 
R. Boadway and H. Kitchen; Canadian Tax Policy, 2nd 
Edition (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984). 
Table 6 provides an indication of government commitment to post-
secondary education. 
Variation in operating grant per student undoubtedly reflects differences in 
provincial priorities. However, absence of adjustment in the EPF for the 
distribution of students and difference in fiscal need and tax capacity also play a 
critical role. Table 5 presents some of the variation in fiscal capacity and tax rates. 
The high tax rates and low fiscal capacity, even after equalization, in the poorer 
provinces indicate the inadequacy of the current equalization formula. Examina-
tion of Tables 4 and 5 reveals the importance of fiscal need and tax capacity and the 
distribution of students. Inferences drawn from these tables are reinforced by 
Table 6. 
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TABLE 6: Indicators of Government Support for Universities 
1982-83 
Province 
Total University Operating Provincial Operating 
Expenditures As as Of Grants Per 51,000 
Provincial GDP Of Personal Income 
Nf Id. 
















1 . 13 
0.91 
0.93 
14 . 16 
11.49 
14.24 
13 . 25 
13. 11 
8 . 1 8 
11.14 
10 . 05 
11.14 
9 . 24 
Canada ] . 1 1 10 . 39 
Source: Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities, Council 
of Ontario Universities, Tripártate Committee on Inter-
Provincial Comparisons. Interprovincial Comparisons on 
University Financing (Toronto, May 1985) 
A quick comparison of Tables 3 and 6 reveals a number of paradoxes. For 
example, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Manitoba 
provide support per student much lower than the national average. Yet government 
support and total expenditure per dollar of provincial product in these provinces 
are above the national average. At the same time, British Columbia and Alberta 
institutions enjoy larger than national average grants per student, but require a 
smaller than national average portion of gross provincial product to do so. The 
explanation for those apparent paradoxes lies in the data presented in Tables 5 
and 6. 
To conclude, the current EPF arrangement has a number of fundamental design 
flaws. First, the transfer is unconditional. Second, absence of adjustment to 
account for the distribution of students across provinces penalizes provinces 
attracting more than their share of students. Finally, an inadequate equalization 
program leaves some provinces without the fiscal ability to support national 
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expenditure standards. These problems can be addressed by adopting a formula 
financing scheme similar to that suggested by Hum for the CAP. This scheme, and 
a number of other reform proposals, are now examined in more detail. 
Horizontal equity and a needs adjusted EPF Transfer 
There are a number of possible reforms to the current EPF program as it relates to 
post-secondary education. As previously noted, direct funding of students is 
consistent with the horizontal equity principle as well as the assumption that 
support for post-secondary education is provided primarily to underwrite teaching 
costs. The recent Macdonald Commission urged this proposal. Since direct 
funding of students would distribute federal monies across Canada on the basis of 
student population rather than provincial population, there would be significant 
interprovincial dollar shifts if the current per capita formula were replaced by 
direct-to-student grants. Table 7 indicates the extent of changes from replacing the 
current EPF program by direct student funding. The Macdonald Commission 
appears unsympathetic to the generalized "public good" feature of universities and 
colleges beyond its specific research outputs. The external benefits which accrue 
to society from the non-teaching activities of universities require that some portion 
of operating expenses be financed by government grants. Obviously there can be 
wide disagreement concerning the appropriate shares of operating costs to be 
borne by student fees and government grants. Rosenbluth and Scott (1981) 
"guess" that fees should finance approximately 25 percent of university operating 
costs while government grants should finance the remainder. Whatever the 
proportions, many are persuaded that a significant fraction of operating costs must 
be directed through non-fee channels; hence the question of a horizontally 
equitable intergovernmental transfer formula. 
The recent Johnson Report (1985), mindful of charges that provinces were 
diverting funds from post-secondary education purposes, recommended a scheme 
of incentive grants. Unlike the Macdonald Commission, it did not favour direct 
student funding. The Johnson reform proposal would grant monies to provinces 
for a particular program, but also contain incentive provisions whereby increases 
in provincial expenditures in the PSE area would attract additional federal grants. 
The Johnson Report proposals would go a long way towards addressing certain of 
the fundamental flaws already noted; particularly the totally unconditional nature 
of the current EPF transfer. However, it does not adequately advance the objective 
of horizontal equity. This latter goal can only be effected through a needs-adjusted 
formula. 
Two principles underlie the rationale for a needs-adjusted EPF transfer. The 
first principle is that citizens in each province should be able to secure benefits 
provided by local post-secondary institutions. This requires not only assuring 
access by students to post-secondary education of comparable standard, but also 
access by citizens in general to the public goods and services provided by 
post-secondary institutions (libraries, research, heritage and culture, etc.). The 
second principle is that citizens in each province should have to make about the 
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same sacrifices (reduced consumption of other goods) to secure these PSE 
benefits. To meet this objective, fiscal transfers must assure that citizens in each 
province face about the same tax rate when securing about the same benefits. 
Concern with access and quality throughout the country can be addressed by 
incorporating an expenditure 'standard' into the EPF transfer formula. The 
expenditure standard, like the standardized basic allowance in Hum's work on the 
CAP, would be a base amount negotiated in advance. An obvious candidate for 
this standard is the Canadian average expenditure per student. However, any 
standards might be negotiated. For example, the per student expenditure in a 
particular province, or the average expenditure per student of a subset of provinces 
are also possibilities. The choice of standard should reflect one's view of the 
expenditure needed to assure post-secondary education of appropriate quality. 
The provincial tax burden of a program which incorporates an explicit per 
student expenditure standard would be sensitive to the number of post-secondary 
students in that province, as well as the provincial tax base of that province. 
Accordingly, these factors should be included in the adjustment. Conveniently, a 
simple index incorporating the requisite information can be defined to calculate the 
appropriate adjustment.5 
The basic rationale underlying the suggested adjustment may be conveniently 
summarized by the correction factor to be applied to each province: 
N(E-u) 
Suppose it is determined that the amount E is the appropriate average expenditure 
per student necessary to maintain the desired standard. Suppose, further, that u is 
the average expenditure per student that a province can afford to spend in the 
absence of fiscal transfers. The amount (E - u) is the expenditure shortfall per 
student; hence, if N is the number of full-time undergraduate equivalents, the total 
expenditure shortfall for the province is N ( E - u). This is the numerator. However, 
this shortfall must be viewed alongside the province's population, P, and its per 
capita revenue from all sources, Y. This is the denominator. Accordingly, the 
ratio T(E) indicates precisely that the necessary correction is dependent on the 
choice of E; it is also directly proportional to the cost factors N and (E - u), the 
number of full-time equivalent students and the expenditure shortfall respectively; 
and inversely proportional to the population and fiscal potential (wealth) of the 
province. This index or correction factor has the following convenient interpreta-
tion. Once the expenditure standard, E, is defined, T(E) is the tax rate that would 
have to be imposed on the average citizen in order to meet the requisite expenditure 
standard for education, the "need" in this case. Obviously, there is still wide scope 
in defining E, Y, and the notion of full-time undergraduate equivalents. These are 
practical problems and many variants to measuring income, full-time equivalents, 
etc. can be accommodated in the suggested formula. 
For example, should the expenditure standard reflect differences in program 
costs? The cost of educating a science student is generally higher than that for an 
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Table 7. Interprovincial Shifts of EPF Payments: Macdonald Proposal 
and Needs-Adjusted Formula 
Percentage Change in EPF Payment 
Direct Without Adjust- With Adjust-
Student ment for ment For Dis-
Funding : Disparities in parities in 
Macdonald Tax Tax 
Province Commission Capacity Capacity 
Newfoundland -8. .5% -58, .0% + 5 . 1% 
P.E.I. -8. .1% -83 . 9% -37 . 6% 
Nova Scotia + 1 . 9% + 20. .3% + 53. . 9% 
New Brunswick -6. .2% -32 . 0% + 15 . ,3% 
Quebec + 1. .7% + 45 . 2% + 63 . 0% 
Ontario + 5. .1% + 3. . 1% -11. .2% 
Manitoba -5 .3% + 4 . . 1% + 15. .3% 
Saskatchewan -8. .2% -31 . 0% -24 . 4% 
Alberta -2 . 2% -30. .0% -71 , .2% 
British Columbia -9 .0% -57 .4% -67 . 1% 
Sources: Col. 1 - Macdonald Commission Report (II, 752, Table 18-1) 
Col. 2 & 3 - authors' calculations based on formulae 
discussed in footnotes. Data from Statistics Canada, 
Education in Canada, Cat. No. 81 and Canadian Statistical 
Review, Cat. 
arts student; graduate programs are more expensive than undergraduate programs; 
etc. We shall choose, as an illustrative expenditure standard, the Canadian average 
expenditure per student, but adjusted for differences in education costs across five 
broad groups of students, namely CEGEP students in Quebec, full- and part-time 
undergraduate university students, and full- and part-time graduate university 
students. Cost differences are thus captured by measuring enrollments using a 
full-time undergraduate equivalency.6 
There are also practical problems due to differences in tax base. For example, 
one could assume, for the purposes of program design, that the equalization 
program had already effectively equalized tax capacity. With this assumption no 
adjustment for tax capacity would be necessary. This possibility is illustrated 
above in Table 7, second column.7 On the other hand, without assuming that tax 
bases are equalized beforehand, the problem of defining the tax base remains. One 
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might then either define a representative tax system, the current approach of the 
Department of Finance, or, alternatively, employ a measure of adjusted provincial 
income, such as that used in recent work by Davenport (1984).8 We employ the 
Davenport approach when making our adjustments for tax capacity in the EPF 
formula.9 
The changes in the distribution of the EPF post-secondary education budget 
which result when either of the two different needs adjustments is used are 
displayed in Table 7, columns 2 and 3. The actual EPF payment in 1983-84 was 
$159.91 per person. Table 7 clearly indicates that substantial changes are required 
if the EPF transfer were to be made consistent with the principles enunciated in this 
paper. 
The Province of Quebec would be the largest beneficiary of our suggested 
changes, simply because that province educates a larger portion of its population 
than any other. Nova Scotia and Manitoba would also gain, but Saskatchewan, 
Alberta, and British Columbia would be big losers. Interestingly, Prince Edward 
Island would also be a loser; this is a consequence of the large number of Islanders 
who go elsewhere for their post-secondary education. 
The changes imposed on other provinces depend on the adjustment formula 
adopted. Not surprisingly, Newfoundland and New Brunswick gain when account 
is taken of differences in adjusted provincial income. Under this adjustment 
Ontario loses. However, when there is no adjustment for tax capacity, Ontario 
gains due to the large number of students there, while New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland lose. 
But whatever the particular details of a needs-adjustment formula, it is 
abundantly clear that reform of the EPF transfer for PSE is overdue, and the 
disparities and fragmented social welfare structure of this country can only be 
eliminated by reforms that are dictated by horizontal equity objectives. 
NOTES 
1 One approach to resolve this political debate is to introduce the notion of primary citizen rights in a 
federal state and to draw upon an explicit normative framework. This perspective is discussed by 
Strain and Hum (1987) who point out that Paretian welfare economics, an approach which 
emphasizes the responsiveness of policy to the preferences of the electorate, favors a decentralized 
federal state. Thus Paretian welfare economics would support the view that horizontal equity is 
important only within a province. However, we also note that arguments by philosophers such as 
John Rawls support the opposite position; namely, that horizontal equity is a general principle, and 
should therefore apply regardless of the constitutional assignment of powers. Our view is that 
neither legal positivism nor normative political philosophy can settle the question once and for all. 
2 One reviewer queries why incorporating provinces explicitly is necessary to guarantee strong 
institutions. The underlying model is the neoclassical theory of choice, suggesting that students will 
choose to go to the strongest (richest) institutions, all things equal. Declining enrollments lead to 
decreasing income for poorer institutions. With less income, these institutions find it harder to 
attract students, etc. The dynamic suggested is: nothing succeeds like success, and nothing fails like 
failure. Support through channels other than purely direct student support is therefore necessary to 
assure a balanced development of institutions to enable students to choose among roughly equal 
institutions. 
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3 The $15 per capita amount may be seen as a floor to the level of services that can be provided. Still, 
there is no incentive to maintain standards. 
4 One reviewer takes us to task for our too-ready acceptance of the federal position in dividing the total 
EPF transfer among the programs in the proportions prescribed by the federal government. Further, 
the reviewer questions the interpretation of the tax portion. With much respect, these perennial 
issues are continuing controversies and both 'federal' and 'provincial' positions are well known. 
We choose not to enter this debate here. The substantive argument of our paper is not affected by 
different apportioning ratios of the EPF transfers. We regard our reform proposal as suggestive 
rather than definitive and if Canada and the provinces were to agree on a different prorationing rate, 
we would simply re-do the arithmetic. However, each province undoubtedly has a different view of 
how the EPF transfer should be apportioned in their province. In a sense, we adopt the federal 
numbers for the pragmatic reason of getting a consistent set of numbers for our illustration. 
5 The needs index used derives from Kakwani (1980). He defines the needs index, P(X), as (N/P) 
(X-u)/U where N is the number of beneficiaries (e.g., poor below the poverty line; P is population; 
U is mean income; X is the expenditure standard (poverty line); u is the pretransfer consumption 
(income) of the average beneficiary. This needs index has an attractive interpretation: it is the tax 
rate that would have to be imposed on the average citizen to eliminate needs. See Hum (1983) for an 
application to the CAP program. 
6 Undergraduate full-time equivalent enrollment is calculated by assuming that (1) each part-time 
undergraduate student is equivalent to 0.4 full-time undergraduate; (2) each graduate student is 
equivalent to four full-time undergraduates; and (3) each CEGEP student is equivalent to 0.8 
undergraduate. The adjustments exclude community college enrollments. 
7 The needs adjustment in this case is t(i) = [N(i)/P(i)x - (N(c)/P(c)]x, where x is the Canadian 
average expenditure; N(i) is the undergraduate full-time equivalent enrollment in province i; N(c) is 
undergraduate full-time equivalent enrollment in Canada; P(i) is the population in province i; P(c) is 
the population in Canada. 
8 The measure of adjusted provincial income developed by Davenport includes natural resource 
revenues and is designed to reflect the income available in each province for consumption. 
Davenport argues that it is a better basis for equalization than the representative tax system. 
9 The needs adjustment in this case is t(i) = [N(i)/P(i)]x - [(N(c)/P(c)) (API(i)/API(c)]x where APl(i) 
and API(c) are adjusted provincial income measures for province i and Canada respectively. 
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